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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine Japanese Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) in the period since World War II 
and the way in which the Japanese have used ODA to further 
Japan's national security interests.
Japanese ODA began as war reparations to Southeast Asia 
in the 1950's. Since then, Japanese aid policy has shifted 
focus three times. These three shifts reflect important 
changes in Japanese aid policy and provide a useful 
perspective for understanding the way the Japanese have shaped 
their aid policy to further their national interests in a 
changing international environment.
First, early Japanese experience with ODA gave them a 
clear understanding of the utility of ODA for Japanese 
economic development, that is, to secure raw materials for its 
industries and to maintain and develop markets for its 
exports. Second, as war reparations declined in importance as 
a rationale for ODA, the Japanese came to see their national 
security interests in economic terms and to see ODA as an 
instrument of national security policy. Third, Japan's 
maturing perception of ODA as an instrument of security policy 
led the Japanese to see ODA as an appropriate response to the 
demands of Western allies (particularly the United States) for 
increased Japanese "burden sharing" with respect to 
international security crises such as the 1991 war in the 
Persian Gulf.
Thus the Japanese have employed ODA as an effective 
diplomatic tool not only with developing countries but also 
with Japan's Western allies, first as war reparations, then in 
conjunction with its neomercantilist economic policy and 
finally as an element of its national security policy.
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JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY:
ESTABLISHING "GREATER EAST ASIAN CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE" 
THROUGH OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
INTRODUCTION
Japan is an emerging great power, yet little is known 
about- the country. The power acquired and supported by its 
economic prosperity seems to confuse people, especially 
those who measure a country's power by military strength. 
Japan has used economic power primarily to protect its 
national interests since the end of World War II.
The national security of a nation requires that it 
assure its survival from one generation to the next. Each 
nation decides its own national interests, considering their 
strength, weakness, obstacles, and availability of means to 
pursue them. In Japan's case, one means to protect national 
security has been economic, because of Japan's poor resource 
self-sufficiency. The nation's economic survival has been 
considered the top priority. The national interest was 
shaped to maintain a steady flow of food and natural 
resources.
Pre-war Japan also considered the military as one of 
the means to attain its national security. Traditionally, 
strength proven by military victories over political and 
commercial rivals has been a means to attain national 
interests. States fought wars to expand territories through 
which they became richer, stronger, and as a result, more
2
3secure. Japan expanded its territories in China and 
Southeast Asia using military force. What confuses people 
today is that post-war Japan uses a different combination of 
means to carve out and protect a viable "living space" in the 
contemporary world. Japan has learned to employ economic 
power primarily to protect and advance its broad security 
interest.
One explanation for the change is the new constitution of 
1946. Japan renounced wars and abandoned possession of any 
military devices other than for defense purposes. This 
provided the guideline for Japan to pursue its national 
interests— securing food and raw materials— by economic means 
alone. However, Japan's geographical and political isolation 
imposed important restrictions by limiting the range of 
economic means of recovery. Germany could be and was 
integrated into the economic bloc of Western Europe; but no 
similar cultural and economic block was available to absorb 
and constrain Japan. Since there was no economic bloc for 
Japan to join, Japan developed its economy independently, 
through trade, and came to see the importance of trade to its 
survival.
It was the pursuit of its national economic interest 
that enabled Japan to survive as a state, to succeed this far 
among the Western democratic nations, and to achieve great 
power status in the post-war world which is now emerging. 
Japan did so with a clear strategy in mind. Without such a
4strategy, its dramatic postwar economic recovery and 
prosperity might not have been possible. What is the 
strategy which made Japan an emerging great power, even a 
threat to others? It was driven by national security—  
economic survival of the nation— which reflected national 
interests.1
In essence Japan's strategy was neomercantilist. It 
regarded foreign trade as the nation-state's most important 
strategic variable for prosperity and power.2 The policy 
applied by Japan was to emphasize export promotion in order 
to acquire necessary resources and meet higher standards of 
international competition to survive in the competitive 
world. In order to support the neomercantilist strategy, 
Japan used its official foreign aid successfully to 
cultivate new markets and maintain them for its exports, and 
to obtain necessary natural resources and food.
Japan began providing foreign aid as war reparation 
payments to Southeast Asian countries in the 1950s. It took 
the form of procurement of Japanese goods, which later 
benefitted Japan by developing markets for Japanese heavy 
industrial products during its miraculous economic 
growth.
Williams S. Dietrich, In The Shadow of The Rising Sun; The 
Political Roots of American Economic Decline. (University Park, 
Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), 62.
2A Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan Press, 1987),
445.
5To illustrate Japanese national interests, Karel van 
Wolferen compares Japan's post-war economic resurgence to an 
earlier campaign to "catch up with the West" in the Meiji 
period (1869-1914). The ultimate goal of both campaigns was 
not directly associated with the welfare of the people, but 
rather with preserving Japan's long-term ability to remain 
an independent power. In the earlier period, Japan's aims 
were defensive: economic growth was considered vital to 
protect Japan from foreign powers. Industrialization and 
militarization went hand in hand as Japan adopted a slogan 
of "rich country, strong military" to promote the campaign 
among public.3 This campaign was necessary in order to 
gather the Japanese people as one and guide the country to a 
common national goal, because the whole country was 
experiencing a very high degree of social change after 250 
years of self-imposed isolation from outside world.
The second catching-up campaign began in the 1950s 
after completion of post-war reconstruction. As opposed to 
the rapid industrial development in the Meiji period, 
industrial dominance by acquiring a large share in the 
international market was considered the key. to the national 
security in post-war era. Since the use of military force 
to shape Japan's external environment was proscribed,
Japan's strategy relied almost exclusively on economic
3Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and 
Politics of a Stateless Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989),
375-376.
6means.4 Vogel writes,
In the early decades after World War II, Japan became, 
accustomed to protecting infant industries and nursing 
them to international competitive standards. Only when 
there was virtually no danger of foreign products 
competing successfully in their home markets would they 
slowly and reluctantly reduce formal tariff barriers. 
They made it virtually impossible until the 1970s for 
foreigners to own their own subsidiaries in Japan or to 
have even indirect economic control over firms in 
Japan.5
Japan did not coin a strategic slogan in the post-war 
era as it did in Meiji period. There was no need for one 
because the campaign— "catching up with the West"— had 
become almost an obsession to the Japanese people in order 
to protect themselves from foreign powers. Once a strategy 
is understood by all the players, a constant reminder of it 
is not necessary. In such an environment, even a 
subconscious strategy can guide the players toward the 
common objective just as a consciously acknowledged 
strategy. So the neomercantilist strategy to pursue Japan's 
national security did not have to be explicitly articulated 
in order to be executed. In post-war Japan, the campaign of 
"catching up with the West" through economic development was 
engraved deeply in the society as a whole; subconsciously 
shared among the people; and vigorously pursued by all.6
4Ibid., 377-378.
5Ezra F. Vogel, "Pax Nipponica?" Foreign Affairs vol. 64 
(Spring 1986), 760.
Van Wolferen writes that although economic growth has 
achieved at their expense, the Japanese have had a single-minded 
dedication to the nation's economic development and prosperity
7Kent Calder argues however, that Japan is a "reactive 
state" by which he means that Japan possesses little 
strategic intent and successful implementation. He lists 
two distinguishing characteristics of the "reactive state": 
(1) the state fails to undertake major independent foreign 
economic policy initiatives when it has the power and 
national incentives to do so? and (2) it responds to outside 
pressures for change, erratically, unsystematically, and 
often incompletely.7 Both conclusions can be challenged by 
reference to Japanese aid programs.
Calder does not deny that Japan has strategic 
objectives which reflect its national interests. However, 
he argues that they are not coherent and actively pursued 
because Japan lacks a strong institutional authority, which 
he believes is an indispensable factor for an active state. 
However, strategy does not necessarily require aggressive 
action or decisive policy style, especially when it is aimed 
at long-run as the cases examined in this study. Postwar 
Japan had a clear strategy to pursue its national economic 
interests and attain national security. The neomercantilist 
policy described below was a means of executing the 
strategy. Furthermore, in the case of Japanese foreign aid
since the Meiji era. Catching up with the strongest in the world 
was the highest goal of every Japanese. Van Wolferen, op. cit.,
376-378.
7Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: 
Explaining the Reactive State," World Politics vol. XL, no. 4 (July 
1988), 519.
8examined in this thesis, the incoherence is not in evidence, 
as Calder argues. Rather, we see a consistent pursuit of 
national interests through the use of official aid.
A single leading agency with a clear and conscious 
strategy is not a necessary requirement for coherent 
strategy conduct. As I will show, cooperation among 
official agencies that share unstated assumptions, norms, 
values, and aims can play the role of a strategy-creating 
institution even in the absence of an explicit Grand Design. 
This is exactly how the pursuit of Japanese national 
security through trade with a use of foreign aid has worked 
since the 1950s.
With an understanding of the characteristics of Japan's 
economic national security, this thesis examines Japan's 
pursuit of its national interests through the use of foreign 
aid. It will pay particularly close attention to three 
Southeast Asian countries as targets of Japanese national 
interests. The thesis will show that Japan, without a 
single strategist, consistently pursued clearly understood 
national interests to satisfy its economic security concerns 
by using foreign aid.
CHAPTER I 
JAPANESE ROLE IN "BURDEN SHARING"
In recent years, Japanese foreign aid policies have 
come under increasing scrutiny and criticism as demands have 
mounted for Japan to increase its contribution to 
international security. As a response to the demand, Japan 
pledged to increase its allocation of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA). However, official foreign aid does not 
fully satisfy international, especially U.S., security 
interests. Rather, it serves as a means of protecting 
Japan's economic security and pursuing its own national 
interests.
Pressure for Burden-Sharing 
The paths Japan took to achieve its national security 
objective have brought criticism of Japan for being a free 
rider. Japanese trade policies brought a prosperous economy 
at the price of severe trade frictions with Western allies, 
especially with the United States. As a result, Japan has 
been pressured for so-called "burden sharing" and to 
contribute adequately to the maintenance of a stable 
international system. The term "burden-sharing" was 
introduced by the United States. Shafiqul Islam describes
9
10
it as follows:
It [the U.S.] contributes a disproportionate share 
of the burden of the common defense of its European 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. 
Burden-sharing, the United States demanded, should be 
more equitable, with Europe shouldering a greater share 
of the cost of its own defense.8
According to Islam, Japan was already on America's list of
"unfair share of burden practitioners" by the late 1960s and
became the top "unfair burden-sharer" in the 1980s. As
Japan gained strength in economies, finance, and technology,
the label of "unfair burden-sharer" accelerated the view of
"Japan as a free rider" at the expense of American share.9
The Use of ODA in Burden-Sharing 
To measure the burden of defense, the share of military 
spending in a nation's GNP is usually used. Japan prefers 
to combine military and aid spending. In 1989, it allocated 
1.3% of GNP— 1% on defense and 0.3% on aid— for its share of 
burden. In spite of the pressure for "burden sharing," 
there are two obstacles to Japan increasing its share 
militarily. First, the Japanese Constitution which 
renounces wars makes it difficult for the Japanese to 
allocate large military budget. The 1% of GNP defense 
budget policy, declared by Prime Minister Miki in 1976, is
8Shafiqul Islam, "Beyond Burden-Sharing: Economics And
Politics of Japanese Foreign Aid," in Yen For Development: Japanese 
Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burden-sharing ed. Shafiqul Islam 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 192.
9Ibid., 192-193.
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also a constraint to a large military. Second, because 1% 
of a very large GNP is a large sum, Japan is already the 
third largest military spender. To further increase in its 
defence budget will upset the former Soviet Union, China, 
Korea, and the ASEAN countries which had brutal experience 
of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Pacific War.10
Considering these factors, the Japanese government 
pledged to increase spending on ODA to meet its share of the 
burden as a member of the world community. The increase was 
first publicly stated in the mid-1970s by then Foreign 
Minister Takeo Fukuda. He argued that Japan should fill the 
role of the United States in Asia through economic 
assistance as American power declined in the region.11 
This argument was put into practice when he became the Prime 
Minister. Fukuda ensured the Japanese commitment by 
announcing the first of a series of medium-term targets at 
the Bonn Summit in 1978. His intention was also to reduce 
the trade surplus with Western nations so that Japanese 
economic security— maintaining markets for Japan's exports- 
-would be protected.12
10Susan J. Pharr, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of 
Representatives, September 28, 1988.
1lRobert M. Orr, Jr., "The Aid Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations," 
Asian Survey vol. XXVIII, no. 7 (July 1988), 745.
12Ibid. , 745-746.
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Doubling Plans and Other Initiatives
The First Medium-Term Target was to double the annual 
value of aid to $2.8 billion in five years. By early 1978, 
Japan's foreign exchange reserves had reached the highest 
point ever and it became apparent that Japan would fulfill 
the pledge. As a result, the original five-year time period 
was shortened to three years and Japan kept its pledge with 
ODA that totaled $3.3 billion in the third year. The second 
plan adopted by the Suzuki Administration in 1981 promised 
again to double the amount of ODA in the 197 6-1980 period to 
$24 billion between 1981 and 1985. Japan failed to keep 
this pledge due to a rapid rise in the value of the U.S. 
dollar against the yen during this period, though it was 
achieved in yen terms.13
The third plan, announced in 1985, set a goal to double 
the 1985 net ODA disbursement level to $7.6 billion per 
annum, and thereafter to extend the total to $40 billion 
during a seven-year period 1985-1992. The sudden jump in 
yen value began in the mid 1980s pushed up the dollar value 
of Japanese ODA. At the 1987 Venice Summit, Japan announced 
that it was going to shorten the target period by two years, 
to 1990. However, this $40 billion target was already met 
by 1988 and Japan had to establish a new target. At the 
Toronto Summit in 1988, Prime Minister Takeshita announced
13Toru Yanagihara and Anne Emig, "An Overview Of Japan's 
Foreign Aid," in Yen For Development. 41-42.
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the fourth medium-term plan which consisted of doubling the 
volume of 1983-87 period to $50 billion from 1988 through 
1992.14
Besides these doubling plans, Japan also announced
"capital recycling measures." The first of these appeared
in 1986 as a $10 billion package of government and private
funds to international financial institutions. The next
package of $20 billion was announced in' May 1987.15
Japan's initiative was further reinforced in a new
cooperation scheme in which the expansion of ODA was
regarded as one of the three main pillars.
In May 1988 the government of then Prime Minister Noboru 
Takeshita announced its "International Cooperation 
Initiative." This initiative reflects Japan's 
acceptance of its natural responsibility as an advanced 
democracy to contribute actively to the protection of 
world peace and the achievement of international 
prosperity by playing a role commensurate with its 
increased international status.16
Japan is fully aware of the importance of open markets 
for its economic security and it would share the burden of 
Europe and the United States for that purpose. Especially 
since the value of the yen skyrocketed in the mid-1980s, the 
urgency felt by the Japanese government can be seen by the 
repeated announcements of doubling plans and other measures 
for helping developing countries.
14Ibid.
15Alan Rix, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity For
Leadership?" Pacific Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 472.
16Japan, MFA Japan's ODA Annual Report 1990. 6.
After being criticized for the quality of its foreign 
aid, Japan began to reform its aid programs to satisfy other
donors and recipients. At the Paris Summit in 1989, Japan
announced allocations of aid in specific areas. It pledged 
$600 million in grant aid to the Least Developed Countries 
(LLDCs) in a three year period beginning in 1990; pledged $2
billion in environmental aid? and presented an initiative in
third world debt relief. For example, the financial 
recycling plan17 was expanded from three to five years and 
taxation measures for Japanese commercial banks were to be 
taken to respond to the new Debt Strategy initiated by the 
U.S. government.18 The Export-Import Bank of Japan and 
Official Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) have also been 
helping indebted countries with new loans and rescheduling 
of payments.
Strong Public Support for ODA
Today foreign economic assistance is widely regarded as
the alternative form of burden sharing to military spending
in Japan. Not only the government but also the public
acknowledge the importance of ODA.
Poor in energy and mineral resources, Japan cannot feed 
itself. To pay for imports of much-needed raw materials
17In order to help heavily indebted countries, Japan provided 
extra assistance measures from its financial surplus as a result of 
highly valued yen.
18Japan, MFA, . Diplomatic Bluebook: Japan's Diplomatic
Activities 1989. 67-69.
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and food, Japan feels compelled to export industrial 
goods. Thus, a peaceful world conducive to free trade 
is a requisite for Japan's security. It is to this end 
that Japan chooses to fulfill its responsibilities as a 
major economic power by offering economic assistance to 
the developing countries.19
This acknowledgement is shown by wide public support.
According to a foreign policy survey conducted by the Prime
Minister's office in October 1988, 39.5% of the public felt
that Japan should expand aid and 44.2% felt Japan should
maintain the present level of aid.20 These figures show
strong cognition of the Japanese of foreign aid.21
Although Japanese security interest behind the foreign aid
is not mentioned repeatedly by the government, the strong
support for aid suggests that the Japanese people understand
the importance of aid to Japan's survival.
Reflecting the public support, Japan's ODA budget 
increases every year at a high rate compared with other 
budget categories which tells how important ODA has become 
for Japanese economic survival. The Japanese government 
announced its decision to allocate 952.2 billion yen ($7.38 
billion)22 for 1992 ODA budget, a 7.8% increase from the
19Akira Kubota, "Foreign Aid: Giving With One Hand?" Japan
Quarterly (April/June 1985), 140-141.
20Japan, MFA Japan's ODA Annual Report 1989. 19.
21According to a poll conducted in 1989, only 4 percent of the 
American considered foreign aid as the most important problem for 
the country. George Gallup Jr. , The Gallup Poll Public Opinion 
1989. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989), 120.
22US$1 = 129 yen is used as the exchange rate for 1992.
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1991 budget, to attain the pledge of Fourth Medium-Term
Target set in 1988.23 As for the total operational
account, the proposed figure is 1,699 billion yen ($13.2
billion) which is a 11.1% increase from the previous year
and first double digit growth since 1984 .24 This increase
is highly significant when the following two facts are
considered: 1) the increase in the defense budget is less
than half of ODA's; 2) a decrease in tax revenues imposes
limits on the 1992 budget as a whole.
The boost in foreign aid spending at a time of limited 
increases in other types of expenditures reflects the 
growing recognition in recent years of Japan's 
international responsibilities, an issue that came to 
the forefront of the political agenda in 1991.25
The recognition of Japan's responsibility can be translated
as Japan's realization that it cannot rely on others to
maintain a favorable world environment for Japan's security.
This is especially so when Europe and the United States
carry economic burdens in Eastern Europe and Latin America
in the time of world wide economic recession.
Thus it can be seen that Japan has responded to the
demands that it carry an adequate share of the security
burden by increasing allocations of ODA to developing
23 "ODA Ohaba 7.8% Zou (ODA Large 7.8% Increase)," Asahi 
Shinbun. 28 December, 1991, p. 1.
24Total operational account includes general account, the 
borrowing from the Fiscal Financing Fund, equity bonds for various 
international development banks and some other special accounts.
25Margo Grimm, "Foreign Aid Boosted in Japan's FY 1992 Budget," 
JEI Report no. IB (January 10, 1992), 10.
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countries. The pace of the increase in the amount is 
impressive. However, the objective of the increase, 
initiated by doubling plans and other development assures, 
did not originally derive from Japan's concerns for 
developing countries. Rather, it was specifically aimed at 
easing Western democratic nations' dissatisfactions with 
Japan over persistent trade imbalances; and, more 
importantly, to prevent the markets from closing for Japan's 
exports. The fact that Japan's doubling plans have always 
been announced at G-7 summits implies who the real audience 
is. Japanese ODA in the scheme of burden-sharing has become 
a very strong reason for its pursuit of a neomercantilist 
strategy to attain its national interests.
CHAPTER II
JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: AN OVERVIEW
Japanese ODA has four types of assistance: 1) Capital 
grants; 2) Technical assistance; 3) Bilateral loans; 4) Aid 
through multilateral agencies. Among the four types, loans 
have always accounted for the majority of the total. Loans 
attract Japanese commercial interests because of the large 
amount of money involved. Also loans are usually spent on 
capital intensive infrastructure projects, which pave the 
way for Japanese direct foreign investments. It can be said 
that through loans, the Japanese have pursued their national 
interests to attain national security. However, the other 
three types of assistance have received greater emphasis 
recently. This is largely due to the mounting criticism and 
pressure for Japan to separate aid from the narrow pursuit 
of national interests. Even as it adapts its aid practices 
to meet others' demands, however, Japan satisfies its 
national interest through the burden-sharing scheme 
discussed in the previous chapter. The emphasis on Asia 
shows Japanese priorities and concentration of interests in 
the region.
18
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Grant Aid
Grant aid provides funds without imposing repayment 
obligations on recipient countries. Japanese grant aid is 
targeted to social infrastructure investments which are not 
allowable under the financing regulations of the OECF, the 
Export-Import Bank of Japan, and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). Grant aid provides financial 
resources for the procurement of equipment, facilities, 
materials, and services necessary for economic and social 
development programs, such as housing, education, medical 
care, research, food and food production.26 Recently, 
environment was added as a new agenda for grants and has 
been paid particular attention in Japanese aid policy.27
Traditionally, the proportion of grant aid in Japan’s 
ODA portfolio has been low. However, the relative share of 
grants has been expanded in recent years in accordance with 
the government1s changing emphasis, due to pressure from 
other donors to improve aid quality. Table 1 shows an 
increasing trend of grant aid not only in amount but also in 
share of total ODA.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) takes a position 
that grant aid should be given to the poorest countries, but 
this does not coincide with actual practice. By 1977, LLDCs
26Alan Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid: Policy-Making And Politics
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 119.
27Japan, MFA Japan's ODA Annual Report 1988. 65.
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received only 2 3% of grant aid. This trend seems to continue 
even today. Table 2 shows the continuous trend of allocation 
of grants to non-LLDCs.
Although Asia received more than half of Japanese grant 
aid in the past and the amount continues to increase, the 
Asian share in recent years has been declining, to 4 6.5% in 
1990. The traditionally large share of the Asian allocation 
reveals JapanVs strong security interests in Asia, but the 
share for Africa (sub-Saharan African countries) has increased 
because of the government's new emphasis on aid to the region. 
This is a result of the urgent humanitarian needs in the 
region. The Fourth Medium-Term Target stated an emphasis on 
LLDCs as one of the pillars, and the emphasis on grants to 
LLDCs, especially to Africa, which has an historically strong 
linkage to Europe, can be seen as a sign of "burden sharing." 
Japanese security interests do not relate directly to the 
African LLDCs, so the implication is that Japan is easing the 
Western nations' share of the African burden.
Technical Assistance 
"Technical cooperation is an activity which teaches and 
transfers technologies, skills, and knowledge which are 
important for the development of human resources, and thus 
contribute to the development of developing countries."28
28Japan's ODA 1988, op. cit. , 75.
21
The aim of Japanese technical assistance is to teach 
Japanese technology and know-how to people in recipient 
countries so that they will be able to play a central role . 
in their own development. The Japanese also believe that 
the personal level of interchange will benefit relations 
between Japan and the recipients.
As with the case of grants, technical assistance has 
been emphasized in Japanese ODA lately for the same reason—  
pressure from other donors. The Fourth Medium-Term Target 
states:
Technical Assistance will be positively expanded in the 
area of human resource development including various 
measures for overseas students, for receiving trainees 
in Japan, and for the dispatch of experts, as well as in 
non-material cooperation including measures for the 
upgrading of the technical level of developing 
countries.29
Although, historically, Japan did not pour funds into 
technical assistance, the trend is changing. The share of 
technical assistance in total ODA is still comparatively 
small, but the actual allocation is surely on the rise. The 
strategy for allocation of grants also applies to technical 
assistance. Its geographical concentration in Asia suggests 
the importance of the region to Japanese economic survival.
The recipients of technical assistance are those 
countries which do not qualify for financial assistance30
29Japanfs ODA 1988, op. cit., 76.
30They are the developing countries with fairly high income, 
accumulated debt, and oil producing countries.
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as well as LLDCs, such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Tanzania, 
which cannot be given a large scale of financial aid because 
they lack human resources and technical devices to utilize 
large amount of money effectively.31 This indicates that 
regions such as Latin America, where heavily indebted 
middle-income countries32 are common, should receive large 
amounts of technical assistance for their share in total 
ODA. Latin America received 8.3% of total Japanese ODA and 
17.7% of total technical assistance in 1989. Table 5 shows 
that a relatively high amount of technical assistance flows 
to Latin America every year. However, since the share of
technical assistance in total ODA is smaller than loans (20%
in 1989), the amount is very small. The top technical
assistance recipient is no match for the top loan recipient.
Bilateral ODA Loans 
In 1990, 42.5% of total Japanese ODA was in the form of 
loans. Historically, the share of loans in Japanese foreign 
aid has been high.33 Bilateral loans, because of the large 
amount of funds exchanged, have a strong influence in 
Japan*s overall bilateral relations with recipients. Alan
^Japan's ODA Annual Report 1988. 75.
32Middle-income countries in 1987 were countries with GNP per 
capita more than $700.
33In 1985 and 1986, more than half of total Japanese bilateral 
ODA was in the form of loans while the United States and Canada 
allocated about 10%, France and Italy about 20%, and Germany about 
30% of total ODA for loans.
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Rix argues:
Yen loans were the core of Japanese foreign aid policy 
and dominated official thinking about aid since Japan 
first became a donor. Loans gave the most pressing, 
impetus to official aid, for through them Japan was tied 
politically and commercially to the world's developing 
nations - as, in debt, were they to Japan.34
The bilateral government loans are given to recipient 
countries through OECF to provide large amounts of funds at 
low interest rates and over long repayment periods. Loans 
stimulate capital intensive projects because they enable 
developing countries to undertake large projects, like 
construction of infrastructure and production facilities, 
which otherwise they cannot afford. In order to repay loans 
with interest, the project must generate high return. This 
is another reason why large capital projects are favored.
The amount of loans through OECF is increasing every 
year. It increased from 1,903 billion yen ($8.6 billion) in 
1981 to 5,950 billion yen ($41 billion) in 1990.35 The 
increase in loans not only attracts Japanese commercial 
interests and enables Japanese business to participate in 
projects but also serves Japanese security interests. 
Improvement of infrastructure is a prerequisite for Japanese 
direct investment and more investment creates stronger
34Rix, Japan's Economic Aid. 38.
35DAC's exchange rates are used for both years. They will be 
applied rest of the paper.
linkages with developing countries.36
As Table 6 illustrates, the share of loans to Asia is 
very high. This is much higher than the share of grants and 
technical assistance. One reason is that many Asian 
countries, especially those which belong to the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have been more 
successful in economic development than other developing 
countries. The requests for ODA loans from these countries 
for large-scale projects are well suited to the 
characteristics and purposes of loans.37 A second reason 
is that the Japanese want to take advantage of the long-term 
aid relationship in the region, begun with reparation 
payments. However, the most important reason is that Japan 
has national interest priorities in ASEAN.38
Multilateral ODA 
The Japanese contributed multilateral ODA funds to 
international organizations for the purpose of economic 
development in developing countries. Multilateral 
organizations can be divided into two groups: international 
financial institutions, which lend funds for development 
purposes, and United Nations agencies, which are engaged
36|,Yuchishogaiyoin wa Yahari Infra Seibi (Investment Obstacle 
is Infrastructure Improvement),1 Kokusai Kaihatsu Journal, no. 418 
(December 1991), 28-31.
37Japan's ODA 1990, op. cit., 81.
38As illustrated later in this thesis, Japan has strong 
security interests for its economic survival in ASEAN.
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mainly in activities relating to technical cooperation.39 
Japan has allocated funds to both types of organization 
since the first international development contribution of 
$80,000 to the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical 
Assistance in 19 5 2 . 40 The share of multilateral 
assistance in total ODA has varied from one year to the next 
in the 1980s, but it has still increased compared with the 
previous decade. The increase is influenced by criticisms 
of Japan's aid practices. These criticisms are best muted 
by channelling aid through multilateral agencies.
There are some advantages to channelling aid to 
developing countries through multilateral organizations. 
First, Japan can obtain important access to the specialized 
knowledge and experience of various organizations. Second, 
multilateral aid can protect Japan's political neutrality. 
Third, Japan can gain precious access to global aid 
networks.41 Since Japan has concentrated its aid in Asia 
in the past and is not familiar with other regions, the 
multilateral aid is a very useful way to distribute Japanese 
funds to less familiar regions effectively. The increasing 
share of multilateral assistance in total ODA explains the
39Ibid. , 88.
40J. Alexander Caldwell, "The Evolution of Japanese Economic 
Cooperation, 1950-1970," in Pacific Basin Development: The
American Interests, ed. Harald B. Malmgren (Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books), 35.
41Japan's ODA 1990, op. cit. , 89.
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Japanese government's attitude toward regions outside of 
Asia where "burden sharing" may be the prominent factor.
Each of the four types of Japanese foreign aid 
satisfies Japan's national interests. Loans are usually 
spent for large capital intensive projects such as 
infrastructure construction and many Japanese private 
businesses profit through participating in such projects.
By improving infrastructure, the recipient countries attract 
Japanese direct investments. These provide Japan with some 
share of the recipients' economies, and serve to secure 
Japanese security interests.
The share of grants, technical assistance, and 
multilateral aid in total ODA has been small compared with 
loans. However, the Japanese government seeks improvement 
in these categories because of increasing criticism of 
Japanese self-serving aid practices. By responding to 
criticism, Japan eases some of the pressures from other 
donors, many of which are important markets for Japan's 
exports. Each of the four styles of Japanese aid helps 
Japan pursue its economic interests and protect national 
security.
CHAPTER III
CHARACTERISTICS OP JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
.Japanese foreign aid has four distinct features which 
emphasize Japanese interests over those of the recipients. 
They are: 1) Japanese aid is highly commercialized; 2) Most 
of Japanese aid goes to Asia; 3) Japan provides more loans 
than grants and technical assistance; 4) The quality of 
Japanese aid is poor compared with aid from other donors. 
These characteristics may be problems and inconveniences for 
the recipients but they,support Japan's pursuit of national 
security interests. This chapter will examine each of these 
characteristics in detail to clarify exactly how they work 
to the Japanese advantage.
Commercialized Aid 
The first characteristic, commercialized aid, is 
described as "large loans and grants to poor countries with 
procurement of Japanese equipment and technology, an 
approach that not only enriches Japanese firms in the short 
run, but also provides them with a strong marketing edge 
once an aid program is finished."42 This statement brings
42Steve Coll, "Japan's Hands-On Foreign Aid: As U.S. Slashes 
Assistance, Tokyo Develops Markets for 21st Century," The 
Washington Post (13, January, 1991), sec. HI.
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up Japan's "request basis" principle. In theory, Japan 
provides aid only when it receives a request from a 
potential recipient country. Project identification and 
recommendation are regarded as the recipient's 
responsibility. However, the identification of projects is 
carried out by Japanese nationals working for private 
consulting firms, trading companies, construction companies, 
and manufacturers.
Developing countries usually do not possess the 
necessary means and skills to conduct the research for 
project identification and to frame applications to win the 
Japanese government's approval. This inadequacy on the 
recipients' part allows Japanese private companies to 
identify projects, state their interests, and request 
projects through official diplomatic channel. It is up to 
the companies whether or not to propose highly priced 
materials which are only available in Japan. The firms 
which are involved in the initial stage of a project usually 
win the contract. Therefore, the private contractors not 
only conduct the identification but are also involved in the 
rest of the project— feasibility study, implementation, and 
monitoring at the project field.43 As a result, the 
Japanese private firms profit greatly from these official
^International Development Study Group, "Shortcomings of the 
Foreign Aid Program," Economic Eve (Spring 1989), 18-19 and Bruce 
Koppel and Michael Plummer, "Japan's Ascendancy as A Foreign-Aid 
Power," Asian Survey vol. XXIX, no. 11, (November 1989), 1054.
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aid projects. This practice is an example of tied aid.44
Table 11 shows the share of tied aid of Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. Although the figures
for Japan do not suggest that a large proportion of Japanese
aid is tied, the actual practice reveals that it is.
Companies in other countries have a hard time 
participating in the business generated by Japan's 
grants and loans even when aid is untied. We should not 
be surprised, accordingly, that foreigners still 
criticize Japan's aid as a government tool for export 
promotion.45
The big private sector has always played a large role 
in Japanese aid activities. Japan stepped into the field of 
economic assistance without a firmly established aid 
organization to oversee aid activities. When the reparation 
agreements were reached with the recipients, a reparation 
division was established in the Asian Affairs Bureau of the 
MFA. However, actual transactions regarding purchasing 
goods and hiring technical services were left to each 
recipient country. It was activity between Japanese 
business and the recipient governments rather than MFA's 
reparation bureau and recipient governments.46 Even 
without strong leadership from the MFA, Japan was successful
44Tying aid means limiting to the contributing countries and 
donor countries the procurement of goods and services for bilateral 
ODA and contributions to international organizations.
45Koichi Mera, "Problems in the Aid Program," Japan Echo vol.
XVI, no. 1, 1989, 14.
46Caldwell, op. cit., 33-34.
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in reflecting the national interests— establishing markets 
for Japanese goods— on procurement.
Concentration of Aid in Asia 
The geographical distribution of Japanese aid greatly 
favors Asia. For example in 1971, as much as 99.3% of 
Japanese ODA went to Asian countries.47 There are three 
reasons which explain this concentration. The first is that 
Japanese aid began as war reparations to those countries in 
Asia. Besides reparation payments, some of the recipients 
were to receive additional assistance from Japan which 
totaled $716 million.48 Japan also promised South Korea 
$500 million for reparations and $300 million for loans in 
1965 with normalization of relations.49 Even after the 
payments ended, it was in Japan's security interest to 
continue assisting countries where official and private ties 
as well as markets for its exports had been already 
established through reparations.
47Japan, MITI, Keizai Kvorvoku no Genio to Mondaiten (The 
Present State and Problems of Economic Cooperation) 1972. 103.
48Myanmar (former Burma) was to receive $50 million for joint 
enterprise investments over 10 years; the Philippines $250 million 
commercial loans over 20 years; Indonesia $4 00 million commercial 
loans and investments over 20 years; and South Vietnam $7.5 million 
in government loans and $9.1 million in commercial loans. Chaiwat 
Khamchoo, Japan's Southeast Asian Policy in the Post-Vietnam Era 
(1975-1985^. (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington 1986), 61.
49Shigeru Oda, "The Normalization of Relations Between Japan 
and the Republic of Korea," American Journal of International Law 
(January 1967), 155-156 quoted in Caldwell, op. cit., 32.
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The second reason for the geographical concentration of 
Japanese aid is that Japan is a large importer of raw 
materials and food from countries of this region. Besides . 
heavy dependence on imported oil, Japan imports 100% of its 
aluminum, nickel, wool and cotton, 98% of its iron ore and 
tin, 94% of its copper and 66% of its lumber.50 When Japan 
lost the war in 1945, she also lost an important source of 
raw materials— Northeast Asia. During postwar period, Japan 
desperately needed a replacement for Northeast Asia in order 
to catch up with the West by rebuilding its economy. Japan 
found it in Southeast Asia. Japan's share of exports from 
Southeast Asia rose greatly in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
During a decade from 1972 to 1982, ASEAN's exports to Japan 
increased almost ten times.51 Japan imports at least 95% 
of its tin, natural rubber and tropical timber from 
Southeast Asia. The region also provides more than a third 
of Japanese copper ore and bauxite imports.52
The third reason is the important of geographical
location of Asia, particularly Southeast Asia.
ASEAN straddles two sea lanes that are essential to 
Japan's economic survival. One is the "petroleum road," 
which originates in the Middle East and weaves its way 
through the Straits of Malacca. The other is the "iron
50IMF White Paper 1980. quoted in John McDonnell, "Japan as an 
importer; Its impact on Asian developing countries," in Japan's 
Impact on the World eds. Alan Rix and Ross Mouer (Nathan, Q. 
Australia; Japanese Studies Association of Australia, 1984), 189.
51McDonnell, op. cit. , 189.
52Ibid. , 192-193.
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ore road,” which starts in western Australia and 
proceeds northward to Japan.53
Besides actually exporting natural resources to Japan,
Asia's geographical location is crucial to maintain the
steady flow of raw materials to Japan from other parts of
the world, which is the lifeline of its economic survival.
Too Many Loans VS Too Few Grants and Technical Assistance 
The third characteristic of Japanese aid which can be 
seen to serve Japanese interests is the historical trend 
that more money is spent on loans, while less is spent on 
grants and technical assistance. The Japanese government 
stresses "self-help" policies to explain the trend. It 
derives from
Japan's own experience as a Third World country, in 
which Japan sought to stand on its own feet economically 
in a world of bigger powers. From that standpoint, 
there is a decided belief in Japan that the goal of aid 
is to produce economic self-reliance in developing 
countries.54
It is because of this "self-help" belief that Japan 
emphasizes loans and encourages the recipients to manage the 
economy with fiscal constraints of obligation to repay. The 
"self-help" policy reflects on another policy, "graduation"
53Susumu Yamakage, "Japan and ASEAN: Are They Really Becoming 
Closer?" in Walter Pfennig and mark M.B. Suh, eds., Aspects of 
ASEAN (Munich, Cologne, London: Weltforum Verlag, 1984), 311,
quoted in Robert M. Orr, Jr., "The Rising Sun: Japan's Foreign Aid 
to ASEAN, the Pacific Basin and the Republic of Korea," Journal of 
International Affairs vol. 41, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 1987), 47.
54Pharr, op. cit.
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policy. Japan takes the recipient's GNP per capita into 
consideration before deciding what form of assistance is 
appropriate and changes the mixture from grants to 
concessional and non-concessional loans.55 Japan also 
changes interest rates and term on loans depending on 
recipient's economic situation.
Japanese national interests are not met by grants and 
technical assistance as much as by loans. Technical 
assistance is not commercially attractive because it usually 
costs less than one-hundredth of a capital project.
Compared with loans, grants do not provide a strong long­
term economic linkage with recipients because projects 
funded by grants are usually short-term and not large scale. 
Grants and technical assistance do not accommodate Japanese 
immediate national security interests other than in 
improving the social infrastructure which keeps ordinary 
people from rebelling against the regime.
Poor Aid Quality 
The fourth feature of Japanese ODA is the poor aid 
quality in comparison with other DAC countries. In order to 
quantify aid quality, the grant share and the grant element 
are often used.56 As Tables 5, 6, and 7 indicate, Japan's
55Robert M. Orr, Jr., "Collaboration or Conflict? Foreign Aid 
and U.S.-Japan Relations," Pacific Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 479.
56A grant share is the percentage of capital assistance that 
do not require repayment. A grant element indicates "degree of 
concessionality of assistance" or "softness." For example, the
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grant shares and grant elements have been very low compared 
with other donors. The Japanese government claims that the 
promotion of self-help efforts and growing needs for Japan's 
type of aid, situated between export credit and grant 
assistance, are the reasons for Japan's poor performance in 
these two categories.57 However, seen from a different 
angle, these figures suggest that Japan's tendency is to 
link official aid to commercial interests and national 
interests.
These four characteristics of Japanese ODA are exactly 
the points criticized by others. They serve Japanese 
national interests and support Japanese national security.
By tying aid, Japan cultivates markets for its exports and 
provides business community with chances to benefit from 
large projects. In the long term, improvement of 
infrastructure, on which loans focus, will bring in Japanese 
businesses to developing countries. Poor aid quality (small 
grant share, grant element, and technical assistance and 
tied aid), combined with large amount of loans, supports 
pursuit commercial interests by the Japanese businesses.
The concentration of aid in Asia shows that Japan's long­
term national interests lie in the region as a source of
grant element of a loan on a commercial basis (10% interest rate) 
is 0%. As the terms (interest rate, repayment and grace period) 
are more alleviated, the figure of the grant element is higher, 
reaching 100% in the case of a grant. Japan's ODA 1990, op. cit., 
7.
57Japan's ODA 1988, op. cit., 26.
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natural resources and markets for exports. The 
characteristics of Japanese ODA clearly show that Japan has 
used its ODA program for the pursuit of its national 
interests and the execution of its neomercantilist strategy.
CHAPTER IV
EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE FOREIGN AID POLICY
Japan's foreign aid policy has gone through four phases 
since the first war reparations were paid to Southeast Asia 
in the 1950s. Each phase is marked by some symbolic events 
and characteristics which shifted the focus of Japanese 
foreign aid: reparations payments in the first phase; the 
oil crisis in the early 197 0s in the second phase; the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion 
of Cambodia in the third phase; and rapid rise in value of 
yen in the fourth phase. This chapter will illustrate each 
phase in more detail and examine Japanese security interests 
in each phase.
Phase One: 1956 - 1974 
Having lost a source of raw materials and markets 
during WWII, Japan sought to normalize relations with 
resource-rich Southeast Asia and acquire access to the 
natural resources and develop new markets there. Both the 
Kishi and Ikeda Administrations saw Asia as a potential 
contributor to Japan's own postwar economic recovery and 
growth. The objectives of Japanese aid during the first 
phase were to expand export markets for Japan's rapidly
36
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developing manufacturing sector and to stabilize the socio­
economic and political systems of recipient countries which, 
in the end, contributed to Japan's own national security.
The aim of promoting Japanese exports was officially
stated by the MFA.
Japan depends on the markets of less-developed countries 
for close to 45 percent of her exports and imports. Her 
trade with Southeast Asia and other newly developing 
areas amounts to approximately 10 percent of her gross 
national product. It is natural, therefore, that Japan, 
which must trade to live, has a vital interest in the 
steady economic development of Southeast Asia and other 
less-developed regions and the expansion thereby of 
their external purchasing powers. For example, Japan's 
new ten-year plan to double the country's national 
income by the end of the plan period (1961-1970) 
envisages a 10 percent annual increase over the base 
year in the total volume of her exports with an average 
of 13 percent annual increase in the exports of heavy 
industrial products. Such rates of increase of her 
exports can hardly be achieved without a steady rise in 
the capacity of less-developed countries to import.58
The Japanese did not connect aid and political objectives in
this phase. Japanese foreign assistance was purely economic
and flowed only to noncommunist East and Southeast Asia.
The second part of the objective, maintenance of stable
socio-economic and political system in developing countries,
derived from Japan's fear of the widening gap between rich
and poor in developing countries, which was becoming
apparent. The Japanese government foresaw a future threat
to Japanese national security, which depended on the
58Japan, MFA, Some Features of Japan's Development Assistance 
(Tokyo: 1961), 1, quoted in Sukehiro Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign
Aid: Policy and Practice (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 17- 
18.
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stability of its export markets in the neighboring 
countries. Japan took various measures, including 
reparation payments, to avoid such threat from developing 
countries.59
Phase Two: 1974 - 1979 
The second phase is described as globalization and 
diplomatic use of Japanese foreign aid. The two major 
changes in aid objectives came as a result of anti-Japanese 
riots during Prime Minister Tanaka’s tour to Southeast Asia 
in 1974 and the oil shock in the winter of 1973/74.
Tanaka's trip called for closer attention to Asia with 
improved aid terms and conditions. Aid became an important 
tool of Japanese foreign policy. The oil crisis not only 
broadened the range of Japan's aid distribution to the 
Middle East, Africa, and countries along energy shipping 
routes but also established a strong linkage between 
Japanese foreign aid and resource availability in the 
recipient countries.60
Prior to this phase, Japanese mineral and oil companies 
engaged only in refining and sales while Western companies 
were active in the whole operation: exploration,
590ther measures include: providing loans; expanding overseas 
investments; cooperating in the Colombo Plan; and contributing to 
the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the 
United Nations Special Fund, Asian Productivity Organization, and 
the World Bank.
60Dennis T. Yasutomo, "Why Aid? Japan as an 'Aid Great Power'," 
Pacific Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 492-493.
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development, and production. Japanese companies had been 
mainly interested in supplying raw materials and energy 
sources as cheaply as possible to Japan. After the oil 
crisis of 1973-74, the Japanese government began to 
encourage private companies to start exploration and 
development projects by using bilateral aid. The producing 
countries ensured Japanese access to resource projects and 
supplies in exchange for economic aid in the form of yen 
credits and technical assistance. Japanese aid was also 
extended to infrastructure construction to complement large- 
scale investments and projects launched by Japanese private 
companies under a policy of MITI.61
Phase Three: 1979 - 1985 
The third phase, described as multi-dimensional or 
multi-purpose, emerged in the late 197 0s in response to 
continuous criticism of Japanese tied aid and mounting 
"burden-sharing1 pressure from the Western countries, 
especially from the United States. Political and strategic 
considerations were incorporated into the original framework 
of Japanese aid policy which focused solely on economy.
This is the period when Japan began to have a severe trade 
imbalance problem with the United States. Japan considered 
it important to help the United States in the area of
61Shoko Tanaka, Post-War Japanese Resource Policies And 
Strategies: The Case of Southeast Asia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell China- 
Japan Program, 1986), 114-116.
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foreign aid by easing its share, taking the pressure off 
from the bilateral trade problem.
The so-called "strategic aid" began in 1978 in the
midst of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia, the Iranian hostage crisis, the Camp
David accords between Egypt and Israel, and the Sino-
Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship.62 Under the
"strategic aid," the Ohira Administration (December 1978 -
June 1980) increased ODA to nations which were important to
Japan and Western allies politically and strategically. For
example, Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jamaica saw
a great increase in flow of assistance from Japan.63
Vietnam was cut off from Japanese aid after invading
Cambodia, and China became a recipient of Japanese economic
assistance for the first time.64 Regarding strategic
interests, one member of the Liberal Democratic Party was
cited as saying that:
"Aid must be considered from the standpoint of national 
interest and not just humanitarian aspects. There 
should be more thoughts given to aid along strategic 
lines. At this point in time, Japanese military efforts 
are restricted, but aid is possible. To some extent, 
aid can be seen as a substitute for defense efforts, but 
Japan must view them [aid and military .policy]
62The "strategic aid" is defined as an assistance to "countries 
bordering areas of conflict."
63See Table 18.
64Dennis T. Yasutomo, Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and
Japanese Foreign Policy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), 
42.
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equally.,|65
The importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship and its 
influence on creating the scheme of the "strategic aid" must 
not be forgotten.66 President Carter influenced the shift 
of Japanese aid policy in the late 1970s. For example, 
between 1977 and 1979, the pace of increase in grants were 
faster than increase in total ODA. The total ODA increased 
189 percent while grants increased 2 57 percent.67
During this phase, economic assistance matured as a 
foreign policy tool to promote social and economic 
resilience; and prevent internal disorder and disputes and 
external intervention. This was very important since 
Japanese economy depended on the targeted countries as 
sources of raw materials and markets. Also, as pressure for 
"burden-sharing" increased in the 1980s, foreign aid began 
to be used as a strong diplomatic tool against Western 
nations. The strategic aid symbolizes a new Japanese 
approach to foreign policy based on economic relations, 
Japanese globalization of diplomacy, and national security 
consciousness.68
65quoted in ibid., 25.
660rr, "Collaboration or Conflict?" op. cit., 746-747.
67Calculated by author based on DAC reports.
^Yasutomo, op. cit., 119-120.
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Phase Four: 1985 - Present
The fourth phase began in 1985, and has continued to 
the present. It is characterized by integration of aid 
policy into overall Japanese foreign policy. Foreign aid 
has become a solid diplomatic tool against not only the 
developing countries but also other donors in this world of 
interdependence. The high value of the yen rapidly 
increased the amount of Japanese aid in dollar terms. As a 
result, Japanese foreign aid has gained a strong presence 
and power in the international community.
According to the ODA Annual Report 1988, 1987 was 
"Japan's year" which saw a spectacular growth in amount of 
ODA. Japan's ODA rose 3 2.3% over the previous year in 
dollar term, reaching $7,454 billion. In 1989, Japan became 
the world's largest donor with ODA allocation of $8,965 
billion. The number of countries for which Japan is the 
largest donor increased from 19 in 1985 to 30 in 1989.
These facts indicate Japan's stronger presence in developing 
countries.
The two medium-term targets which emerged in this phase 
were more comprehensive compared with the two previous ones. 
They aimed at increasing not only the total amount but also 
efficiency and effectiveness of Japanese aid.69 They 
stressed an increase in ODA/GNP ratio, technical assistance, 
and aid staff; an expansion of debt relief measures for
69Japan, MFA, Outlook of Japan's Economic Cooperation. 15.
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LLDCs; and qualitative improvement of yen-denominated loans. 
Japanese government realizes that in order for Japan to 
survive in the world, it has to maintain good relations.with 
both developing and developed countries through the tool of 
foreign aid.
As illustrated here, Japan has been concerned about its 
national interests and national security in every phase of 
aid policy. The target of aid in the first and second 
phases was aimed at developing countries for purely economic 
interests. However, the latter two phases saw a political 
use of aid against other Western nations for national 
interest and national security purposes. Japanese ODA has 
been a tool to protect national security by securing raw 
materials in developing countries and by maintaining export 
markets in other Western countries.
CHAPTER V
JAPANESE FOREIGN AID TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
To illustrate the evolution of Japan's ODA program 
through the four phases described above, three brief case 
studies will be presented here. Southeast Asia has been the 
main destination of Japanese foreign aid. The three 
countries of ASEAN examined in this chapter— Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand— have always been major recipients 
of Japanese aid. As a matter of fact, Japan was the top 
donor to all three countries in 1989. ASEAN, which 
accounted for over 30% of total Japanese disbursement in 
1990, provides much needed resources and markets to Japan. 
The large amount of aid poured in ASEAN shows that Japan’s 
security interests lie in the region. It is in Japan's 
interest to maintain good relations with Southeast Asian 
countries for its national security.
Indonesia
The year 1958 marked three important accomplishments in 
Japan-Indonesia relations: the establishment of diplomatic 
relation? the settlement of war reparation negotiations 
which began in 1951; and the conclusion of the Economic 
Cooperation Agreement. The reparation payment, which
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totaled $223.3 million, was provided through purchase of 
Japanese goods and services. The economic cooperation 
agreement stated that Japan would provide $4 00 million over 
a period of twenty years.
ODA to Natural Resource Development 
The Japanese government had committed itself to support 
investment projects to develop major natural resources in 
Indonesia, namely petroleum, nickel, and lumber. There are 
two well known projects in Indonesia supported by both the 
Japanese government and private Japanese companies: the 
North Sumatra Oil Project and the Asahan Aluminum Project. 
The Sumatra Project exemplifies a shift in Japanese aid 
policy from merely buying already available resources to 
securing the resource through participating in development 
efforts. The Asahan Project illustrates export of resource 
processing to a producing country and infrastructure 
construction accompanies with it.
The North Sumatra oil fields were owned by Royal Dutch 
and Shell before the Indonesian government took them over in 
1957 .70 In 1958 the Indonesian government agreed to 
receive Japanese capital and technology to rehabilitate 
north Sumatra's oil fields in exchange for the oil supply to 
Japan. The Japanese government provided yen credits to
70Masashi Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia: 
Tokvo-Jakarta Relations. 1951-1966 (Honolulu: The University Press 
of Hawaii, 1976), 117-118.
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purchase equipment, facilities and services from Japan in a 
ten-year period. This was going to be repaid with oil 
export to Japan for ten years. The North Sumatra Oil 
Development Cooperation Company was established in 1960 with 
37.5% of the necessary capital provided by OECF. By the 
time the operation ended in 1973, seven more similar 
projects were under operation in the area. All of them were 
engaged in the same form of production-sharing.71
In 1972, the Japanese government agreed to offer 
further assistance, 62 billion yen ($20 million) in credit, 
to Indonesia for an oil exploration project. Later a 56 
billion yen ($18 million) credit was approved by the 
Japanese government for liquid natural gas (LNG) development 
projects. The Japanese government provided the necessary 
capital for petroleum projects in Indonesia through credits 
and loans.72 It promoted the Japanese private investments 
in the oil industry with support in capital and security. 
Japan's policy to diversify oil supply sources after the oil 
crisis in the early 1970s further encouraged Japanese 
involvement in Indonesian oil and LNG industries.
Throughout the 19 60s and early 1970s, Japanese 
companies' desire to smelt overseas, due to its energy- 
intensive operation, coincided with the Indonesian 
government's policy to promote domestic smelting. The
71Tanaka, op. cit. , 84-90.
72Ibid.
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Japanese government then designed the Asahan Aluminum 
project, the largest Japanese project overseas with 400 
billion yen ($1.5 billion by 1973 exchange rate) in 
Indonesia, which included construction of two hydroelectric 
powerplants and an aluminum refinery. It was a form of 
joint venture in which the Japanese government provided one- 
half of the total Japanese investments through OECF. In 
1978 and 1979, Japan extended yen credits through OECF as a 
project assistance.73 As illustrated by the two projects, 
Japanese aid in Indonesia developed around natural resource 
industries and much of the fund had been spent directly to 
promote the industry until the 1980s.
Loans for Debt Payments 
The fall in oil prices in the early 1980s decreased the 
Indonesia's foreign exchange revenue and brought severe 
budget and balance-of-payment problems. This also affected 
the country's ability to implement Japanese foreign aid 
projects. Tokyo has increased program assistance in ODA 
lending to reduce pressure on Indonesia for project 
implementation.74 At a meeting with President Suharto in 
January 1987, the MITI Minister Tamura pledged broader 
assistance to boost Indonesia's export-oriented
^Ibid., 95-96.
740rr, "Rising Sun," op. cit., 52.
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industries.75 Meanwhile the second fall in oil prices in 
1986, while the value of yen doubled, further hit the 
Indonesian economy. The country's public and private debt 
amounted $4 5.7 billion, one third of it owed to the 
Japanese, mostly to the government, in yen. Indonesia 
requested to pay back its official debt at 1986 exchange 
rate. However, instead of accepting Indonesia's request and. 
approving payment at the 198 6 exchange rate, Japan responded 
with almost doubling its ODA from $1.23 to $2.3 billion.76 
Japan also provided $100 million in grants and lowered the 
interest rates on the Indonesian loans from 3% to 2.7%.77
In 1989 Indonesia was still suffering from the drop in 
oil revenue, and also from unemployment caused by recession. 
Repayments on foreign debt were taking 4 0% of government 
revenue. Prime Minister Takeshita visited Indonesia with an 
aid package of $2 billion in soft loans and $110 million in 
grants and technical assistance.78
75"MITI Minister Tamura Pledges Increased Aid to Indonesia," 
Asahi Evening News. 13 January 1987.
76,'Japan Balks at Indonesian Debt Plan," Asahi Evening News. 
8 June 1988.
77In order to enforce "self-help" efforts with repayment 
obligation, Japan often provides grants to indebted countries after 
they make the payment to help them balance their government budget. 
The amount of grants are usually the same as the amount repaid by 
the recipients. Mr. Shiro Sadoshima, First Secretary, Embassy of 
Japan, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, D.C., 10 
March 1992.
78 "Indonesia and Japan: Donors' kebab," Economist May 13 1989,
77.
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Attracting Direct Investments 
The high value of the yen encouraged Japanese 
manufacturers to move their facilities to Southeast Asia, 
first to Singapore, then to Thailand and Malaysia, and 
finally to Indonesia where the labor cost is 95% lower than 
in Japan.79 It must also be mentioned that improvement in 
infrastructure funded by Japanese loans met one of the 
criteria for direct investments. This trend began to show 
some positive effects in Indonesian non-oil and gas exports. 
The economic growth rate of non-oil and gas industries was 
5.7% in 1988 and 7.4% in 1989. Their value in exports 
increased by $2 billion during the same period.80 The 
mushrooming loans, pledged technical assistance, and 
lowering interest rates, accompanied by private investments 
in manufacture, may be helping Indonesia shift its focus 
away from oil and LNG industries.
A Case of Japanese ODA Project 
The case illustrated here is called “The Borobudul 
Prambanan National Historic Park Construction Project" in 
central Java.81 The Borobudul was a Buddhist temple which
79Ford S. Worthy, "Japan's Spreading Regional Power," Fortune 
vol. 122, (Fall 1990), 96.
80Japan, MFA, Diplomatic Bluebook 1990: Japan's Diplomatic
Activities. 148.
81The information on this project is summarized in 
"Insensitivity or Menace?: The Borobudul National Historic Park," 
AMPO Japan-Asia Quarterly Review vol. 21, no. 4, 33-36.
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was constructed in late 8th century or early 9th century and 
buried underground until its discovery in the 19th century. 
The Pranbanan (Loro Jonggrang) Temple is a beautiful example 
of Hindu architecture, 4 0 km east of Borobudul. The project 
was aimed to attract more tourists into the area by 
constructing a major historic area surrounding the ruins.
The project took off in 1980 with a 440 million 
yen($1.9 million) loan from Japan followed by a 2.8 billion 
yen($11 million) loan in 1982. The project required 350 
households on 85 hectares of the construction site to leave 
their houses and land. Many of the local residents were 
engaged in sap-gathering and sugar-processing, and others 
operated souvenir shops. The residents had to leave the 
project site either with compensation much lower than market 
price or with other lands. Having completed the project, 
the number of tourists increased. They go to an expensive 
restaurant for tourists in the park which is a branch of 
Ambarukmo Hotel in the suburbs of Jogjakarta. The hotel was 
built with Japanese reparation payments, is run by Japan Air 
Lines, and has become a popular hotel among Japanese 
tourists. The people who used to live there are now 
construction workers and vendors living in much worse houses 
than before.
This is an example of commercialized aid. Japanese 
business benefitted from the large construction. However, 
the recipients' ordinary people's interests were totally
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ignored.
The Philippines 
The Japanese reparation payments to the Philippines 
began in 1956 and totaled $550 million over twenty years. 
Much of infrastructure and public facilities had been 
destroyed by bombing during the Pacific War. As a result, a 
large portion of the reparations was spent on public works, 
transport and communications, education, and health 
facilities between 1959 and 1969.82
During the reparation period, Japan's share in total 
ODA to the Philippines was significantly lower than that of 
the U.S. However by the end of the 1970s, the positions 
were reversed. Loans through the OECF began in 1971 and 
since then, the rapid increase in loans put Japan as the 
number one donor to the Philippines. By 1986, Japan's loan 
commitment to the Philippines stood at 515 billion yen, or 
approximately $2.3 billion.83 Since Corazon Aquino became 
the president, the Japanese government has been pledging 
loans to ease her country's debt crisis in order to 
stabilize the economy.
Aid Under "Burden-Sharing"
The Philippines is one of the most controversial
82Filologo Pante, Jr. and Romeo A. Reyes, "Japanese and U.S. 
Aid to the Philippines: A Recipient-Country Perspective," in Yen
for Development. 122.
83Pante and Reyes, op. cit., 12 5.
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recipients of Japanese ODA. It brought up two criticisms 
among the Japanese. The first criticism was that Japan was 
providing aid to the Philippines to support American 
strategic objectives.84 Especially after the Vietnam War 
and emergence of communist nations in Indochina, the 
presence of American military bases in the Philippines 
increased the importance of the country. Even since the 
reparations ended in 197 6, the Philippines have been a major 
recipient of Japanese aid. This coincided with the 
emergence of "strategic aid" and "burden-sharing" in 
Japanese aid policy. This trend was confirmed when the 
Japanese government joined with the U.S. to support the 
mini-Marshall Plan for the Philippines in July 1989.85
The second criticism was that Japanese aid to the 
Philippines (in the period 1972 to 1986) was merely filling 
the coffers of the Marcos family. This relates to the first 
criticism on the point that Japan was serving U.S. interest. 
The U.S. sought to maintain good relations with the 
Philippines and also desired to see a stable government for 
its bases. Japan continued the aid flow even though it knew 
of aid-related kickbacks to Marcos.86 This criticism
840rr, "Rising Sun," op. cit., 53.
85Yanagihara and Emig, op. cit., 62.
86President Marcos was believed to have received rebates of 
Japanese foreign aid. The amount sometimes totaled as much as 15% 
of an aid project. In order to cover the corruption, Prime 
Minister Nakasone suggested that Philippine Vice President 
Salvatore Laurel regard the issue as a domestic matter. Yuji
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increased after the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 
August 19 8 3.87
Two Cases of Japanese ODA Project 
Two cases of Japanese ODA in the Philippines show the 
commercialism of Japanese aid and the strong influence of 
Marcos family on aid projects. The first project is called 
"The Outpatient Department of the Philippine General 
Hospital"88 which first appeared as a $6.70 million plan 
submitted by the director of the department at the hospital. 
The aim was to improve equipment and extend consultation 
hours in order to accept 2,000 patients a day; to function 
as a supplement of the Metro Manila medical facilities; and 
to initiate research to extend progressive medical care 
throughout the country. In August 1985, the budget was 
increased to $10 million, to be funded by grants-in-aid. 
Because the Philippine government changed hands in February 
of 1986, the project was forgotten for a year until the 
Japanese government re-acknowledged it. At this time the 
budget was increased to $20 million.
After fifteen-months of construction work by a Japanese 
construction firm, the inauguration ceremony took place on
Suzuki, "Rethinking Japanese Foreign Aid," Japan Times 30 June 
1986, 8.
870rr, "Rising Sun," op. cit. , 53.
88The information on this case is summarized in "A Showcase of 
Japanese High Technology: Outpatient Department of the Philippine 
General Hospital," AMPO, op. cit., 24-25.
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April 5, 1989. The three-story modern building has four 
divisions: consultation, diagnosis, management, and the 
common section equipped with a $600,000 CT Scan unit, a 
$200,000 X-ray diagnostic apparatus, and other computerized 
office facilities. The completion of construction was not 
the end of a project and problems still remained for the 
Filipinos. The high technology equipment is dependent on 
Japan for repair parts, and consumption goods must be 
imported from Japan. The Japanese construction firm 
benefitted from the project and so did the supplier of 
equipment. Grant aid, even though the government says 
"untied", can be tied in this way.
The second case, "The Expansion of the National 
Maritime Polytechnic Project,"89 hoped to increase the 
number of eligible crew to work on foreign ships.In 1983, 
12.4% of Filipino crews worked on foreign ships. They were 
obliged to send 80% of their earnings back home by the 
Philippine government. This was an important source of 
foreign exchange to the Philippines. In order for a crewman 
to work on foreign ships, he must receive training required 
by international treaty and be certified. There were two 
national training facilities; the Philippine National 
Merchant University in Manila and the newly founded National
89The information on this project is summarized in "Nakasone 
sori no temiyagewa sanjyunanaokuen (Prime Minister Nakasone's 
souvenir is 3.7 billion yen," Musekinin eniotaikoku Nippon 
(Irresponsible Great ODA Donor. Japan) (Tokyo, Japan: JICC
Publisher, 1989), 47-52.
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Maritime Polytechnic. Both facilities had requested 
assistance for the expansion to the Japanese government. 
Japan considered the university as the prime project until 
Imelda Marcos made a special request eighteen days before 
Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the Philippines. The 
Japanese government changed its mind and decided to aid the 
polytechnic expansion. After the meeting between President 
Marcos and Prime Minister Nakasone on May 7, 1983, the 
project progressed step by step and the first official 
contract was signed in June 1984.
By March 1986 a first rate, even by international 
standards, modern training facility was constructed with a 
total of 37 million yen.90 The original plan was to train 
7 60 students per year, but there were only 2 2 students 
enrolled in the first semester and only one of them finished 
the fifteen week course. Even with some adjustment made in 
courses to attract more students, the facility has not been 
used even to 5% of its goal. The school itself cannot 
collect the necessary fees (tuition), so the money must come 
from taxpayers' pockets because the maintenance cost is paid 
by the recipient country. The main reason for the under­
utilization is said to be the location of the school. It is 
located in a small regional city of Tacloban in Leyte, 25 
hours from Manila and with no major commercial port.
90$155,110 by 1985 exchange rate and $219,558 by 1986 exchange
rate.
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However, it is the province of the Romualdez family, whose 
best known member is Imelda Marcos.
Thailand
Unlike Indonesia and the Philippines, Thailand has 
maintained trade relations with Japan since the end of World 
War II. Japan was Thailand's biggest export market in 
1983 .91 Since then Thailand has been a major recipient of 
Japanese aid. In 1988 Japan provided 70.2% ($360.62 
million) of total bilateral ODA received by Thailand.92 
However, the Thai people see a different picture. For them 
the United States is the largest donor and over two thirds 
of them think the beneficiary of Japanese aid is "Japan 
itself."93 The main reason for this negative image of 
Japanese ODA is that 80% of the fund is in the form of yen 
loans, which accumulated to over 690 billion yen ($5.4 
billion by 1988 exchange rate) by 1988. A large portion of 
the loans are spent on infrastructure and large-scale 
projects such as roads and dam construction, communication 
Systems, and harbor expansion.
Trinity of Assistance, Investment, and Import 
Japan regards Thailand as the industrial base of the
91T. H. Silcock, "Outline of Economic Development 1945-1965," 
in Thailand: Social and Economic Studies in Development ed. T. H. 
Silcock (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1967), 17.
92Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA '90. 78.
93"Building Roads for Japanese Investment," AMPO, op. cit., 38.
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ASEAN economy. MITI Minister Tamura announced the "New 
Asian Industries Development (New AID Plan) in January 1987 
during his visit to Bangkok. This model calls for the 
trinity of assistance, direct investment, and import as a 
cooperation package to promote synthetic development of each 
recipient. Cooperation with Thailand has already been 
carried out.94 There are massive Japanese private 
investment flows into Thailand. The rapid increase in yen 
value has created a strong trend to move production to 
developing countries. The 1989 Japanese investment in 
Thailand was $1.2 billion which was more than the total of 
previous 3 5 years combined.95
There are several reasons for the popularity of 
Thailand as an investment target. Thailand offers; 1) a 
cheap labor force with good quality; 2) political stability; 
and 3) investment promotion measures.96 The Japanese 
Ambassador, Okazaki, said "Thailand, like Japan, is 
Buddhist. And a monarchy. And a civilized country with a 
government that respects contracts and leaves business 
alone.1,97
Further, Narongachai Akrasanne, director of the
94Japan, MITI Keizai Kvorvoku no Genio to Mondaiten. 1987 
(Reality, and Problems of Economic Cooperation). 166-168.
95Arthur Zich, Japan's Sun Rises Over the Pacific" National 
Geographic vol. 180 no. 5 (November 1991), 55.
96Japan, MITI Keizai Kvorvoku no Genio to Mondaiten 1987. 66.
97Zich, op. cit., 56.
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Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, stated:
We're easy to get along with. For 700 years we've been 
an inland trade route, a land bridge between north and 
south. We are mixed, like the Americans. Our identity 
is cultural not ethnic: We're Thai, Indian, Malay,
Chinese-name it. There is no racial discrimination 
here. The Thai people rarely have strong feelings about 
anything.98
Japanese ODA is said to be making a foundation by improving 
infrastructure for Japanese business opportunities.
Thailand is a major exporter of tin to Japan. Since 
tin is not considered a significant industry, massive 
"develop and import" policies, like those seen in the 
Indonesian petroleum industry, did not exist in Thailand.99 
Instead, a rapid increase in aid flow to Thailand was the 
result of "strategic aid." The Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia in 1978 caused a massive influx of Indochinese 
refugees into Thailand. The burden on what was already the 
poorest region in Thailand could not be borne by the Thai 
government alone. The increase in aid since the invasion 
was so rapid that Thailand became the second largest 
recipient of Japanese ODA after China in 1983 .100
98Ibid.
"Tanaka, op. cit., 108.
100Chart in William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr, Jr. "Japan's 
Foreign Economic Assistance," Asian Survey, vol. XXV, no. 3 (March 
1985), 330.
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A Case of Japanese ODA Project
The Thai Cultural Center101 was one of the projects 
undertaken to commemorate one hundred years of friendly 
relationship between Japan and Thailand. It was constructed 
with 640 million yen ($4.4 billion by 1987 exchange rate) 
grants-in-aid from Japan and opened in October 1987. The 
Center has a large auditorium with 2,000 seating capacity 
and a smaller one with 500 seating capacity. There is an 
Education Hall with exhibition rooms, a series of audio­
visual rooms, a library, conference rooms, etc. Both the 
center's exterior and the interior are magnificent. The 
sound and lighting system of the large auditorium is high 
tech and its seats can be moved with a signal button. There 
is equipment for the simultaneous interpretation of up to 
four languages.
Cultural activities and recreation are the main purpose 
of the center and these are not free. In order to use the 
large auditorium for three hours, for example, one must pay 
36,000 baht, which few can afford, for air-conditioning and 
sound and lighting system, etc. Also, due to the high 
rental charge, the admission cost is two to three times more 
than the cost for seeing a movie at an ordinary movie 
theater.
From the beginning, everything was done by the
101The information on this project is summarized in "Thailand 
Cultural Center: Better to Call it Japanese?," AMPO, op. cit., 40- 
42.
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Japanese; including the designing of the building, the 
procurement of materials, and the construction. The Thais 
received only a low amount of wages for construction labor. 
The under-utilized facilities cost the Thai government 20.79 
million baht, 18.5 million baht, and 17.98 million baht, 
respectively, for the three years between 1987-89. In a 
recent period, they were used eleven days out of two months. 
The equipment and spare parts will have to be bought from 
Japan in the future, which adds more cost to the Thai 
government. Again, profit for Japanese contractors and 
burden for the recipient came out of so called "grant aid."
As illustrated above, Japanese national interests 
have always influenced its aid policy in Southeast Asia. 
Since the region was the first recipient of Japan's first 
ODA— reparation— , it has the longest history of 
accommodating Japan's national interests. The region 
provides raw materials which Japan needs for its domestic 
industries, markets for Japan's exports, and direct 
investment opportunities. By tying aid, Japanese business 
gained long-term access through the development assistance 
projects. These are exactly the points criticized by 
others, but have worked to the Japanese advantage since the 
beginning of ODA history.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Japan has developed through trade. Since military 
means to meet its goals were taken away after the World War 
II, Japan’s survival as a nation, has had to depend on an 
economic means, specifically its ability to import raw 
materials and export finished products. Japan's national 
security interests— obtain secure access to natural 
resources and markets for its exports— stem from its 
inability to survive on its own. The Japanese were well 
aware of this fact. This is why Japan used the 
neomercantilist policy to pull itself out of a lost war and 
achieve economic prosperity. Japan did so by successfully 
pursuing its security interests through the use of foreign 
aid.
Japanese foreign aid first began as war reparations to 
Southeast Asia through which Japan promoted exports of 
finished products from its growing heavy industry. The 
reparations were provided as procurement of Japanese goods 
and services. Southeast Asia was also able to provide Japan 
with its much needed natural resources. The heavy 
concentration in the region during this period well served 
Japan's national interests.
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After the oil shock in 1973/74, Japan's focus on the 
national security through neomercantilist strategy shifted 
towards securing natural resources. It insured access to 
resources by expanding geographical distribution to the 
Middle East and Africa and participating in resource 
development projects with financial and technical support 
through official aid. Japan also began to allocate foreign 
aid to countries which are located along its energy shipping 
routes in order to maintain the flow of resources. The 
North Sumatra Project in Indonesia is a typical case of a 
"develop and import" scheme which emerged during the second 
phase. Loans provided to finance big development projects 
greatly profited the Japanese contractors and also a 
established long-term relationship through tied aid.
In the late 197 0s, the world saw aggressive military 
invasions by communist regimes. This influenced Japanese 
foreign aid policy towards being political and facilitated 
the use of foreign aid as a diplomatic tool. By providing 
assistance to countries, where conflicts exist in 
neighboring countries, under the scheme of "strategic aid," 
Japan protected its access to resources by developing 
countries and protecting export markets there.
Japanese "strategic aid" to countries with Western 
strategic interests was also used as a diplomatic tool to 
ease the mounting pressure of "burden sharing." Europe and 
the United States were increasingly dissatisfied with trade
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imbalances with Japan. Therefore, it was very important for 
Japan to take some share of the burden in order to keep good 
relations with its allies and leave Western markets open for 
Japanese exports. The aid to the Philippines is a good 
example of aid by "burden-sharing." Since the Philippines 
was not a significant source of raw materials and export 
markets for Japan, the U.S. role in influencing Japanese 
decisions to maintain the large flow of aid to the country 
cannot be ignored.
The last phase, which still continues today, has seen 
important changes in the world as well as in Japanese aid 
policy. The rapid increase of yen value has led to
satisfaction with the quantity of Japanese aid and, as a
result, has shifted the focus to quantitative improvement 
emphasis. The end of the Cold War has also led Japan to
shift aid from providing large aid to strategically
important countries to the important markets, Western, 
democracies, and improving aid quality. Furthermore, the 
continuous criticism from other donors about concentration 
of aid in Asia and commercialized aid, illustrated in 
projects such as "The Borobudul Prambanan National Historic 
Park," "The Philippine General Hospital," and "The Thai 
Cultural Center," has played a role in improving the aid 
quality and geographical allocation. As a result of these 
factors, the Third and Fourth Medium-Term Targets emphasize 
improvement in quality and allocation to the LLDCs as the
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main pillars. The pressure for "burden sharing" has further 
increased in accordance with the high value of the yen and 
the severe trade imbalances with the West, especially with 
the United States.
In the post-war period, Japan has always had a fear of 
not having enough resources for its industries and a lack of 
markets to sell its exports to. Whether it was reminded 
repeatedly or not, it is clear that Japan always had this in 
mind. Japanese foreign aid has served as a means to pursue 
the national security in order to eliminate this fear. It 
has become a common practice of Japanese foreign aid not 
only to secure the flow of natural resources from developing 
countries but also to assure open export markets in 
developed countries by shouldering some of the Western 
countries1 share of burden. After almost four decades 
Japanese foreign aid has firmly established a position in 
Japanese overall foreign policy as a diplomatic tool to 
pursue national security in this world of interdependence.
APPENDIX I: TABLES
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Table i  
Japan's Grant Assistance 
(Million Dollars, %)
Year 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1987 1989
Amount 121 220 273 948 1,416 1,744 2,011 2,028
Share in 
Total ODA
38.6 39.9 48.2 50.0 39.6 47.5 47.3 n.a.
Share in 
Bilateral ODA
32.6 28.8 24.6 30.9 34.0 46.3 n.a. 44.8
Source: DAC Reports, Outlook of Japan's Economic Cooperation, and Japan’s ODA 1988 
and 1990.
Table 2
Distribution of General Grant Aid to LLDCs 
l%)
Year 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
LLDC 30.4 22.2 26.7 30.8 32.2 39.3 33.0 35.8
MSAC 32.8 50.8 32.9 31.8 26.7 23.7 25.9 23.5
Others 36.8 27.0 39.4 37.4 41.1 37.0 41.1 40.7
Source: Japan's ODA 1987 and 1990.
Note: Grant aid for debt relief is included.
MSAC: Most seriously affected countries by the oil crises.
67
Table 3
Major Recipient Countries of Grant Assistance 
(percentage of total ODA)
1981 1983 1985
Rank- Country Share Country Share Country Share
1 Thailand 9.60 Thailand 9.01 Bangladesh 8.48
2 Bangladesh 8.50 Bangladesh 7.45 Thailand 7.18
3 Pakistan 6.42 Burma 6.62 Burma 5.96
4 Burma 5.49 Pakistan 5.97 Pakistan 5.19
5 Indonesia 5.00 Philippines 5.48 Sri Lanka 5.15
6 Sri Lanka 4.94 Indonesia 5.28 Philippines 4.69
7 Nepal 4.87 Sri Lanka 5.14 Indonesia 4.66
8 Philippines 4.69 P.R. China 5.13 Sudan 3.69
9 Egypt 3.24 Nepal 3.81 Nepal 3.56
10 Sudan 2.82 Sudan 3.73 P.R. China 3.38
1988 1989 1990
Rank Country Share Country Share Country Share
1 Bangladesh 7.07 Bangladesh 7.90 Bangladesh 9.60
2 Philippines 6.61 Philippines 7.06 Philippines 6.63
3 Pakistan 5.42 Pakistan 4.76 Thailand 5.53
4 Thailand 4.65 Thailand 4.43 Sri Lanka 5.41
5 Sri Lanka 4.42 Sri Lanka 4.22 Indonesia 4.25
6 P.R. China 3.97 Indonesia 4.06 Pakistan 4.08
7 Indonesia 3.56 Zambia 3.71 Senegal 3.65
8. Zaire 3.00 Kenya 3.13 Kenya 3.61
9 Sudan 2.98 Tanzania 3.02 Egypt 3.30
10 Nepal 2.76 Sudan 2.87 P.R. China 2.75
Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1987, 1988, 1990, and Outlook of Japan’s
Economic Cooperation
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Table 4
Geographical Distribution of Bilateral Grant Assistance 
(Million Dollars)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Asia 481.79 654.37 683.92 762.40 639.16
Northeast Asia 25.68 54.53 52.35 58.53 38.61
Southeast Asia 241.88 278.01 260.69 330.98 273.00
Southwest Asia 214.22 321.83 370.88 372.89 327.55
Middle East 82.55 107.90 127.10 97.53 113.24
Africa 211.90 272.98 525.96 518.59 423.23
Latin America 45.06 79.24 96.30 119.20 117.17
Oecania 45.06 36.09 46.06 54.20 61.40
Europe - 0.34 - 1.08 -
Unallocable 1.05 3.13 3.85 3.05 19.85
Total 854.55 1,154.06 1,483.19 1,556.06 1,374.05
Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1987, 1988, 1989, and Outlook of Japan’s 
Eocnomic Cooperation
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Table 5
Bilateral Technical Cooperation 
(Million Dollars)
Year 1965 1969 1973 1976 1981 1985 1989 1990
Amount 6.01 18.96 57.24 108.1 338 422 1,556 1,374
Source: DAC Reports
Table 6
Geographical Distribution of Bilateral Techincal Assistance 
(Million Dollars)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Asia 367.73 451.10 601.74 613.29 707.39
Northeast Asia 97.28 129.28 177.40 189.63 275.51
Southeast Asia 222.28 257.52 342.58 343.63 351.24
Southwest Asia 44.53 61.69 78.13 76.75 76.30
Unspecified 3.54 2.61 3.64 3.28 4.32
Middle East 43.40 52.03 72.55 83.22 96.06
Africa 69.35 89.74 110.41 113.46 124.89
Latin America 129.19 152.77 185.62 181.27 199.10
Oceania 16.39 20.05 28.98 30.07 32.00
Europe 2.90 2.67 4.28 5.03 11.85
Unallocable 219.80 298.69 420.90 454.86 474.06
Total 848.66 1,067.04 1,424.49 1,481.20 1,645.35
Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1987, 1988, 1989, and Outlook of Japan’s 
Economic Cooperation
70
Table 7
Sectoral Distribution of ODA Loans 
(Million Dollars, percentage of total ODA)
1987 1988 1989
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share
Social Infrastructure 
and Services 276 5.3 801 9.1 355 7.2
Economic Infrastructure 
and Services 3,324 64.7 4,480 51.1 2,131 42.5
Production Sectors 422 8.3 1,215 13.8 563 11.5
Multisector 49 0.5 52 1.1
Progam Assistance 1,048 20.4 1,981 22.6 1,620 32.1
Debt Reorganization 67 1.3 247 2.8 156 3.1
Unallocated 14 0.1 14 2.5
Total 5,137 100.0 8,786 100.0 4,890 100.0
Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1988, 1989, and 1990
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Table 8
Geographical Distribution of Japan’s ODA Loans 
(100 million yen, %)
1982 19.84 1986
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share
Asia 3,643 65.5 5,084 88.5 2,868 74.8
ASEAN & 
Burma
1,948 35.0 2,930 51.1 2,630 35.8
Middle East 783 14.1 266 4.6 589 12.3
Africa 483 8.7 84 1.5 399 1.3
Latin
America
655 11.8 307 5.3 305 10.9
Oceania & 
Others
0 0 8 0.1 103 0.8
Total 5,563 100 7,323 100 7,323 100
1987 1988 1989
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share
Asia 6,280 67.3 9,255 83.0 7,087 70.1
ASEAN & 
Burma
3,233 21.7 4,821 43.1 4,358 43.1
Middle
East
389 13.8 545 4.9 794 7.9
Africa 290 9.3 972 8.7 805 8.0
Latin
America
72 7.2 264 2.4 1,206 2.1
Oceania & 
Others
6 2.4 120 1.1 214 2.1
Total 7,037 100 11,156 100 10,105 100
Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1987 and 1990
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Table 9
Share of Multilateral Assistance of Major DAC Countries 
(percentage of total ODA)
Japan U.S. France West
Germany
U.K. DAC
Average
197.6 31.9 34.5 14.0 24.6 30.4 30.4
1978 30.9 38.7 13.1 35.5 42.1 34.0
1980 40.7 38.8 16.8 34.9 28.4 33.6
1982 21.7 40.7 17.9 28.1 46.8 33.6 .
1983 35.5 31.2 17.6 33.9 46.7 32.5
1984 43^8 25.9 16.3 32.9 45.2 31.5
1985 32.7 13.0 18.4 32.7 43.8 25.5
1986 31.7 20.5 18.5 31.0 41.8 28.5
1987 29.6 21.7 18.4 29.6 46:1 27.5
1988 29.7 33.3 18.4 33.0 45.9 31.1
1989 24.4 11.1 17.7 35.8 43.4 26.7
Source: DAC Reports
Note: Figures include contributions to EEC.
Table 10
Share of Multilateral Assistance in Japan’s Total ODA 
(percentage of total ODA)
Year 1970 1976 1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Share 18.9 31.9 40.7 43.8 32.7 31.7 29.6 29.7 24.4
Source: DAC Reports
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Table 11
Share of Tied Bilateral Aid of DAC Countries 
(percentage of total ODA)
1986 1987 1988 1989
Australia 38.7 44.0 43.7 89.6
Austria 68.8 74.3 98.1 83.6
Belgium 52.9 49.4 n.a. n.a.
Canada 35.1 35.1 n.a. 52.2
Denmark 28.9 30.0 26.3 n.a.
Finland 38.2 55.8 73.5 79.2
France 46.6 40.9 45.4 48.5
West Germany 36.3 42.9 45.2 n.a.
Ireland n.a. 33.8 n.a. n.a.
Italy 65.4 71.7 87.7 90.9
Japan 13.4 11.3 12.8 18.0
Netherlands 15.8 14.0 14.1 13.7
New Zealand 34.5 34.2 40.2 n.a.
Norway 15.2 24.2 42.4 28.7
Sweden 15.3 24.6 31.1 (29.1)
Switzerland 23.9 35.9 20.5 n.a.
United Kingdom 64.5 61.8 82.6 76.0
U.S.A. 38.9 18.0 54.2 45.4
Source: DAC Reports 
Note: ( ) is provisional figure.
: Figures for 1987 are tying status of all ODA. 
: Figures for 1989 are commitment basis.
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Table 12
Share of Geographical Distribution of Bilateral ODA 
(percentage of total ODA)
1975 1980 1982 1985 1988 1990
Asia 75.0 70.5 68.6 67.7 62.8 59.3
Northeast Asia 8.9 4.2 15.8 15.3 11.3 12.0
Southeast Asia 50.1 44.0 33.5 37.6 34.2 34.3
(ASEAN) (44.7) (35.9) (28.9) (31.3) (29.9) (33.1)
Southwest Asia 15.6 22.2 19.0 14.7 17.3 12.9
Unspecified 3.9 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0
Middle East 10.6 10.4 8.2 7.9 9.1 10.2
Africa 6.9 11.4 11.3 9.9 13.8 11.4
Latin America 5.6 6.0 7.8 8.8 6.2 8.1
Oceania 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.4 1.6
Europe 0.0 - 0.1 0.0 0.1 2.3
Unallocable 1.3 1.2 3.3 4.8 6.6 7,1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1989 and Outlook of Japan’s Economic 
Cooperation
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Table 13
The Major Recipients of Japanese Bilateral ODA 
(percentage of total ODA)
1970 1975 1980
Rank Country Share Country Share Country Share
1 Indonesia 33.87 Indonesia 23.27 Indonesia 17.43
2 Korea 23.35 Korea 10.28 Bangladesh 10.70
3 Pakisatan 10.65 Philippines 8.27 Thailand 9.43
4 India 8.81 Malaysia 7.44 Burma 7.59
5 Philippines 5.18 Egypt 5.90 Egypt 6.12
6 Thailand 4.55 Bangladesh 5.53 Pakistan 5.59
7 Iran 3.22 India 5.48 Philippines 4.70
8 Burma 3.21 Thailand 4.85 Korea 3.80
9 China 2.57 Iraq 3.50 Malaysia 3.27
10 Singapore 1.55 Nigeria 3.21 Sri Lanka 2.23
1985 1988 1990
Rank Country Share Country Share Country Share
1 China 15.17 Indonesia 15.34 Indonesia 12.50
2 Thailand 10.33 China 10.49 China 10.42
3 Philippines 9.39 Philippines 8.33 Philippines 9.33
4 Indonesia 6.31 Thailand 5.62 Thailand 6.03
5 Burma 6.02 Bangladesh 5.32 Bangladesh 5.38
6 Malaysia 4.91 Pakistan 4.71 Malaysia 5.37
7 Bangladesh 4.75 Mynmar 4.04 Turkey 4.67
8 Pakistan 3.65 Sri Lanka 3.11 Pakistan 2.79
9 Sri Lanka 3.27 India 2.79 Sri Lanka 2.54
10 Egypt 2.86 Egypt 2.69 Poland 2.16
Source: DAC Reports and Outlook of Japan’s Economic Cooperation
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Table 14
Reparations and Reparation-related Grants 
To Southeast Asian Nations 
(Million Dollars)
Reparations Economic Development 
Grants
Country Period Amount Period Amount
Burma 1955-65 2.0 1965-77 140.0
Cambodian - - 1959-62 4.0
Indonesia 1958-70 223.3 - -
Laos - - 1959-61 2.8
Malaysia - - 1968-70 8.2
Philippines 1956-75 550.0 - -
Singapore - - 1968-70 8.2
Thailand - - 1962-69 26.7
South Vietnam 1960-64 39.0 - -
Total 1012.3 189.9
Grand Total 1202.2
Source: Chaiwat Khamchoo, Japan’s Southeast Asian Policy in the Post-Vietnam 
Era (1975-1985) (Ph. D. diss., University of Washington 1986), 61.
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Table 15
Japan’s Grant Share of total ODA and Grant Element
(%)
Year 1970 1972 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1985
Grant Share 38.6 32.6 48.2 48.1 40.0 39.6 46.1 47.5
Grant Element 67.2 61.1 74.9 75.0 74.3 74.0 73.7 73.6
Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1987 and 1988.
Table 16 
Grant Share 
(percentage of total ODA)
Country Rank 1986 Rank 1987/88 Rank 1988/89
Australia 1 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
New Zealand 1 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
Ireland 1 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
United Kingdom 1 100.0 8 97.8 8 98.1
Norway 5 99.2 6 99.4 6 99.7
Sweden 6 98.7 1 100.0 1 100.0
Canada 7 98.6 9 97.4 9 97.8
Switzerland 8 96.4 5 99.5 1 100.0
Finland 9 94.7 10 91.9 10 94.4
Netherlands 10 93.7 13 86.4 12 87.6
U.S.A. 11 91.1 11 91.2 11 92.6
Italy 12 90.2 15 76.9 14 76.9
Belgium 13 87.1 12 . 90.6 13 (87.0)
France 14 (78.1) 14 78.2 15 (73.1)
Denmark 15 77.1 7 88.1 7 98.7
West Germany 16 75.6 16 69.0 16 (68.5)
Austria 17 65.1 17 64.6 17 (48.8)
Japan 18 60.7 18 46.6 18 43.2
Source: DAC Report 
Note: Excluding Debt Relief 
: ( ) are provisional figures.
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Table 17
Grant Element 
(percentage of total ODA)
Country Rank 1986 Rank 1987/88 Rank 1988/89
Australia 1 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
New Zealand 1 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
Ireland 1 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
U.K. 1 100.0 9 99.0 9 99.1
Canada 5 99.9 6 99.6 6 99.7
Sweden 6 99.8 1 100.0 1 (100.0)
Norway 7 99.4 6 99.6 6 (99.7)
Switzerland 8 99.2 5 99.9 1 (100.0)
Finland 9 98.4 10 97.7 10 98.2
Belgium 10 97.8 13 94.0 12 (96.7)
Netherlands 11 97.6 12 94.1 13 94.2
Denmark 12 97.4 8 99.5 6 99.7
U.S.A. 13 96.8 11 96.9 11 97.5
Italy 14 96.0 14. 92.0 14 (92.8)
West Germany 15 89.1 16 86.1 16 (86.4)
France 16 86.1 1 89.3 15 (89!7)
Japan 17 81.7 18 75.4 17 77.6
Austria 18 79.6 17 76.2 18 (68.1)
Source: DAC Reports 
Note: Excluding Debt Relief 
: ( ) are provisional figures.
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Table 18
Total Japanese ODA 
(Million Dollars)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Egypt 67.3 118.8 132.7 123.5 72.7 72.4 60.0
Jamaica 0.3 0.1 1.0 2.4 6.5 3.4 6.2
Pakistan 50.6 73.4 184.3 132.8 126.6 107.6 92.6
Thailand 59.4 127.2 188.8 275.8 236.6 194.8 354.2
Turkey 7.1 10.8 23.8 33.4 137.0 67.7 93.8
Source: OECD Reports
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